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Abstract
We examine optimal provision of riskless government bonds under asymmetric information and
safe asset scarcity. Paradoxically, corporations have incentives to issue junk debt precisely when
intrinsic demand for safe debt is high since uninformed investors then migrate to risky overheated
debt markets. Uninformed demand stimulates informed speculation which drives junk debt prices
closer to fundamentals, encouraging pooling at high leverage. Acting as borrower of rst resort,
the government can issue safe bonds which siphon o¤ uninformed demand for risky corporate
debt and reduce socially wasteful informed speculation. Thus, government bonds either eliminate
pooling at high leverage or improve risk sharing in such equilibria. The optimal quantity of
government bonds is increasing in intrinsic demand for safe assets and non-monotonic in marginal
Q.
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In recent years the set of safe stores of value has contracted. For example, the credit crisis
of 2007/8 revealed the exposure of senior tranches of securitizations to correlated defaults. The
Eurozone crisis called into question the safety of some sovereign debts. Finally, scal weakness
undermined condence in deposit insurance in some jurisdictions. At the same time, these crises
stimulated investor demand for safe stores of value. The perceived combination of diminished supply
and increased demand for safe assets has led some to argue there is a scarcity of safe assets. In this
vein, a recent Global Financial Stability Report of the IMF (2012) states, In the future, there will
be rising demand for safe assets, but fewer of them will be available. . . 
Of course, one might reasonably expect any safe asset scarcity problem to be self-correcting.
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2012) argue the economy as a system will strive to compensate for any
shortage.For example, if pension funds and insurers have a strong demand for long-duration safe
stores of value, one might expect an issuing corporation with long-lived capital assets to adopt a low
leverage ratio, supplying long maturity debt with low default risk. However, Stein (2013) points out
that it is the junk bond market that has grown in recent years, with record volumes of high-yield
debt issuance, leveraged loans, and dividend recapitalization transactions, as well as high debt-to-
EBITDA multiples in leveraged buyouts. In light of these trends, Stein, and other policymakers
have called for tools to identify and respond to debt market overheating.
In this paper we put forward a positive framework for understanding the conjunction of safe
asset scarcity and an overheated corporate debt market. We then develop a normative framework
to analyze whether and how variation in the supply of safe government bonds can be used as a
policy tool to inuence equilibrium in corporate debt markets and increase social welfare. The
model is predicated on a canonical corporate nance friction: asymmetric information between
the corporation and investors regarding cash ows. Following Ross (1977), the privately-informed
corporation chooses a debt face value and then uses the proceeds to fund a scalable investment
delivering a private benet Q > 1 per unit invested. The terminal period payo¤ on the asset-
in-place backing the debt is either low (L) or high (H). This payo¤ is veriable ex post, but
unobservable to investors ex ante.
We depart from the extant debt signaling literature by allowing investors to purchase corporate
debt in a securities market modeled à la Kyle (1985). There are perfectly competitive market-makers
who clear the market and a speculator who can exert costly e¤ort to acquire a noisy signal regarding
the asset payo¤. In addition, there is a continuum of uninformed investors who would prefer to carry
funds across periods using a riskless store of value. There is safe asset scarcity, which the corporation
can remedy by issuing riskless debt. The positive question addressed is whether the corporation
can be expected to eliminate the problem of safe asset scarcity by providing uninformed investors
with an information-insensitive store of value. The normative question addressed is whether the
government can increase social welfare by acting as a borrower of rst resort with an eye toward
inuencing the corporate debt market equilibrium.
As we show, regardless of the severity of the safe asset scarcity problem, the equilibrium set
always includes pooling at riskless debt. Further, the equilibrium set always includes a separating
equilibrium where the corporation with positive private information signals this by issuing riskless
debt with low face value, leaving the shareholder to bear the residual cash ow risk. If either of
these two equilibria is implemented, the initial problem of safe asset scarcity is self-correcting, with
uninformed investors being insulated from adverse selection.
Critically, the problem of safe asset scarcity need not self-correct. This is because, as we show,
if there is su¢ ciently high intrinsic demand for safe storage, the private sector may actually pool at
risky rather than safe debt. That is, risky debt can be imposed on investors precisely when doing so
generates a large negative externality. The argument is as follows. If there is safe asset scarcity, a
portion of uninformed investor demand migrates to the risky corporate debt market. The prospect
of trading against uninformed investors encourages speculator information production and informed
trading. In turn, informed trading brings the risky debt price closer to fundamentals. And with less
severe underpricing, a corporation with positive private information is more willing to pool at risky
debt.
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The preceding argument suggests a role for the treasury or central bank to increase welfare
by varying the quantity of safe government bonds made available to investors, with the goal of
inducing the corporate sector to implement the socially preferred equilibrium. To see this formally,
suppose as we do that the government acts as a Stackelberg leader, having the ability to o¤er the
public access to safe storage (bonds), with the public storage being insu¢ cient to ll the intrinsic
uninformed demand for safe assets. Despite this constraint, the government can potentially ensure
an adequate aggregate supply of safe assets by increasing the amount of safe government bonds
o¤ered. After all, uninformed investors will substitute any available riskless government bonds for
risky corporate debt in their portfolios. The anticipation of less uninformed trading in the corporate
debt market deters speculator information production. This widens the gap between debt prices
and fundamentals. With su¢ cient underpricing anticipated, high debt pooling equilibria unravel.
Notice, the role of government debt here is to crowd-out risky debt and crowd-in riskless corporate
debt.
Although it may be feasible for the government to eliminate the high debt pooling equilibrium
in the manner just described, doing so does not necessarily increase social welfare. On one hand,
anticipation of adverse selection in the risky debt market will induce distortions in the portfolios
of uninformed investors. Against these costs, government must weigh the NPV of the incremental
investment nanced by higher debt issuance. As we show, crowding out junk debt (and investment),
increases social welfare only if marginal Q is su¢ ciently low relative to intrinsic storage demand.
The arguments made thus far suggest that the optimal government debt policy is binary: O¤er
the maximum feasible amount of government bonds if the goal is to eliminate the high debt pooling
equilibrium, and zero otherwise. However, we show it may also be optimal for the government to
o¤er an intermediate amount of bonds. If marginal Q is high, social welfare will be higher if there
is pooling at risky corporate debt. But that does not imply optimality of zero government debt.
Rather, o¤ering a limited supply of government bonds serves to increase social welfare given pooling
at risky debt. After all, government bonds can still siphon uninformed demand, decrease speculator
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e¤ort, and mitigate distortions in the portfolios of uninformed investors. Here government policy
must be ne-tuned since too much siphoning can put in jeopardy the high debt pooling equilibrium.
We turn now to related literature. Perhaps most similar to our paper is that of Stein (2012) who
also argues that central bank operations can serve to mitigate negative externalities associated with
private sector debt decisions, increasing social welfare. In his model, banks can choose between long
and short-term debt, with households placing higher value on the latter due to its relative safety.
The privately optimal amount of short-term debt (money) creation can be socially excessive. This
is because banks fully capture the social value of safe assets, enjoying lower nancing costs when
they rely on short-term debt. However, they do not always internalize the re-sale externality that
emerges should a common shock force them to liquidate assets in order to deliver on their short-term
debts. Here the central bank can cool the short-term bank debt market by withdrawing reserves.
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) also analyze the equilibrium supply of riskless debt in a setting
where uninformed investors prefer safe storage. In their model, uninformed investors carve out a safe
debt claim for themselves. In contrast, we show a privately informed issuer can have the opposite
incentive, switching from riskless to risky debt when uninformed investors have high demand for
safe storage.
In the model of Woodford (1990), government bonds directly increase welfare by providing agents
with an intertemporal store of value. Holmström and Tirole (1998) analyze the social welfare benets
of government bonds when limited veriability constrains the private supply of stores of value. They
consider a setting with hidden action and potential production ine¢ ciencies. In their model the role
of government debt is a direct one, in that it increases aggregate storage dollar for dollar. In our
model, government bonds can have a disproportionate multiplier e¤ect on the aggregate supply of
safe assets by crowding out corporate junk debt and crowding in riskless corporate debt.
In the model of Gorton and Ordonez (2013), projects are positive NPV but loans must be backed
by collateral. Some producers have low quality collateral and will be cut o¤ from credit if investors
acquire information. The government can increase producer collateral by making them a gift of its
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bonds backed by future tax collections. In their model, safe government debt serves to crowd-in
risky borrowing while in our model government debt serves to crowd-out risky borrowing.
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) emphasize that investors value liquidity and safety,
with variation in government debt leading to variation in equilibrium compensation for illiquidity
and risk. Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2010) develop and test a theory of corporate debt maturity
predicated upon a related mechanism, arguing corporations can lower their cost of debt capital by
lling the gaps left when the government changes its debt maturity structure.
The most important di¤erence between our proposed theory and existing gap lling theories is
that we argue corporations may not ll government debt gaps like-for-like. In particular, we predict
that a su¢ ciently large reduction in government debt will indeed increase the supply of corporate
debt, but this debt will be risky not safe. Consistent with our argument, Greenwood and Hanson
(2013) nd that the high-yield share of corporate debt otations is actually inversely related to
Treasury yields. This suggests that corporations respond to safe asset scarcity by supplying more
risky debt.
Graham, Leary and Roberts (2014A) shed additional light on this empirical question. They doc-
ument a negative cross-sectional relationship between rm-specic debt-to-asset ratios and the ratio
of government debt to corporate assets. Importantly, this negative relationship is statistically indis-
tinguishable for corporations with high and low default risk. Instead of focusing on cross-sectional
leverage relationships, Graham, Leary and Roberts (2014B) analyze the time series relationship
between aggregate corporate and government leverage ratios. They nd that the ratio of aggregate
corporate debt to aggregate corporate assets is inversely related to the government debt to GDP
ratio. As they show, this relationship is particularly pronounced over the period 1950 thru 1970,
when the aggregate corporate leverage ratio increased from 10% to 35% while the ratio of gov-
ernment debt to GDP decreased from 100% to 10%. Consistent with the cross-sectional evidence,
the propensity of corporations to increase leverage over this time period held across high and low
leverage categories. It is hard to reconcile these stylized facts with existing gap lling theories.
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After all, if the goal is to increase the supply of safe assets in response to a decrease in government
debt, riskier rms should decrease not increase leverage. Moreover, it is not clear that the increased
leverage of safer rms is consistent with an increased supply of safe assets. After all, increases in
leverage imply reductions in credit quality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the economic setting.
Section II describes bond pricing. Section III describes the equilibrium corporate leverage decision.
Sections IV and V analyze the optimal provision of safe government bonds. Section VI considers
model extensions.
I. The Economic Setting
There are two periods (1 and 2) and three categories of agents: government, corporation(s), and
investors. The government and corporation o¤er bonds and investors buy them. All investors enter
the model with su¢ ciently large endowments in period 1 to purchase their desired portfolios. The
period 2 endowments of investors are not veriable so they cannot issue securities backed by them.
Holmström and Tirole (1998) also rule out unsecured credit based on limits on veriability.
Investors cannot privately store their period 1 endowments, e.g. privately stored goods will be
stolen or decay. The absence of such private storage creates the possibility of a scarcity of stores of
value, in the spirit of Holmström and Tirole (1998). In fact, each investor could be endowed with
limited safe storage without changing results. The critical assumption is that private storage, here
normalized to zero, is smaller than intrinsic storage demand.
The government has the unique ability to store goods from period 1 to period 2 without any risk
of theft or decay. To illustrate clearly the ability of the government to raise social welfare through
its borrower-of-rst-resort capability, it is assumed to have no other capabilities. In particular, the
government can neither verify endowments in order to collect taxes nor redistribute resources.1 In
1Endowing government with ability to tax and redistribute creates a trivial rationale for government to transfer
funds to positive NPV investments.
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our parable economy, the government simply has the ability to collect goods from investors in period
1, place them in public storage, and return them in period 2. Essentially, government bond investors
receive risk-free ination-protected debt claims. The governments ability to provide such risk free
stores of value is assumed to be limited, however. In particular, the maximum capacity of the public
storage facility is G 2 [0;1):
The objective of the government is to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function placing equal
weight on each agent. The government acts as a Stackelberg leader in debt markets, with a Cournot
structure discussed as an extension. In particular, the government moves rst by specifying the
amount of storage G 2 [0; G] that it will make available to investors. If requested storage exceeds
G, it will be allocated on a pro rata basis.
The corporate sector acts as follower in the Stackelberg game. Specically, just after the gov-
ernment species G, a private corporation chooses its debt level. We initially focus on the leverage
decision of a single corporation, with interdependence between corporate capital structure decisions
analyzed as an extension. The corporation is controlled by a manager-owner (the managerbelow)
who cannot raise outside equity funding due to his ability to costlessly divert discretionary cash
ow.2 The manager has vNM utility function over consumption QC1 + C2; where Q > 1: The
corporation has an asset-in-place but no internal funds, and the manager has no other funds. The
asset-in-place will generate an observable and veriable cash ow in period 2. The cash ow is either
L or H; where H > L > 0: The asset type, denoted T 2 fL;Hg, is equivalent to the cash ow the
asset-in-place will generate. Each asset type is equally likely, and investors do not observe asset
type. In contrast, the manager privately observes the asset type in period 1.
The privately informed manager chooses his corporations leverage by specifying a debt face value
D due in period 2. The proceeds raised by the debt otation are used to nance a dividend in period
1. The manager enjoys limited liability so the period 2 payo¤ on the debt is the minimum of T and
D: As captured by the managers utility function, each unit of funding the corporation receives in
2With outside equity, the qualitative welfare tradeo¤s remain. Low corporate leverage leads to e¢ cient risk sharing
and high leverage leads to high investment.
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period 1 provides the manager with Q units of utility. There are two alternative interpretations for
why the manager utility parameter Q is greater than one. First, one may think of the manager as
being impatient. Second, one may think of the manager as using the funds received from investors
to nance a new investment providing him with a private benet. In this, our chosen interpretation,
Q represents marginal Q.
There are three categories of investors who invest in government and corporate bonds. There is a
measure one continuum of uninformed investors (UI). The UI are analogous to the liquidity traders
of Gorton and Pennacchi (1990). They are akin to pension funds and insurance companies in that
they are risk-averse and have a preference for safe storage. The UI have identical stochastic period
2 endowments Y2 2 fZ   N;Zg with the parametric assumption 0 < N  Z:3 Each realization of
Y2 is equiprobable. The negative endowment shock satises the following two inequalities:
N > G
N  L
2
:
The random endowment shock generates noisy bond demand, as one observes in reality, and is
essential if informed speculation is to be protable. The rst inequality above implies the government
cannot ll all intrinsic demand for safe assets. The second inequality implies the corporation has the
ability to meet the intrinsic demand for safe assets by issuing debt with face value L. The specic
form of the second inequality plays an additional technical role ensuring market-makers never face
a call to take short positions, which is infeasible for them given limits on veriability.
Each UI has linear utility over period 1 consumption and concave utility over period 2 consump-
tion. We follow the tractable specication of risk-aversion of Dow (1998) in that the period 2 utility
of each UI is piecewise linear, with a concave kink at a critical consumption level which is just equal
to Z.4 The UI di¤er in the intensity of their aversion to consumption shortfalls. An uninformed
3Assuming perfect correlation only serves to simplify the algebra.
4Other smooth utility functions could be assumed, with more complex aggregate UI demands.
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investor with preference parameter  has vNM utility function:
U(C1; C2; )  C1 + minf0; C2   Zg: (1)
Each UI is averse to period 2 consumption falling below the critical level Z; creating an intrinsic de-
mand for safe storage when confronted with a low terminal endowment. The intensity of aversion to
low terminal consumption is captured by : The  parameters have support   [1;1) with density
f and cumulative density F: The distribution is atomless, with f strictly positive and continuously
di¤erentiable. It is apparent that when faced with the prospect of a low future endowment, each
UI would like to invest in a riskless security delivering N units in period 2, bringing C2 up to the
critical level Z.
There is a risk-neutral speculator S with vNM utility function C1+C2. Her period 1 endowment
is Y s1 and her period 2 endowment is normalized at zero without loss of generality. The speculator
is unique amongst investors in that she observes a private signal s 2 fsL; sHg of the true asset type.
The speculator chooses the precision of her signal, , from a feasible set   [12 ; 1]: Signal precision
is dened as follows:
  Pr[T = Hjs = sH ] = Pr[T = Ljs = sL]:
The speculator must exert costly e¤ort in order to generate an informative signal. The speculators
e¤ort cost function e is twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly convex,
with
lim
# 1
2
e() = 0
lim
# 1
2
e0() = 0
lim
"1
e0() = 1:
Since e0 is strictly increasing, it has a well-dened inverse
	  [e0] 1:
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In addition to the uninformed investors and speculator, there are a large number of risk-neutral
market-makers (MM below). Each MM has vNM utility function C1+C2. Their aggregate period 1
endowment is Y mm1 and their period 2 endowment is normalized at zero without loss of generality.
Investors form beliefs regarding the true asset type based upon the managers choice of D.
The speculator and UI anonymously submit simultaneous orders for government safe storage and
corporate debt. Prior to submitting her orders, the speculator pays the e¤ort cost e() and observes
her signal s regarding the asset type T . Prior to placing orders, the UI privately observe their period
2 endowment. The corporate debt price is set as in Kyle (1985): the MM observe aggregate order
ows and bid up the corporate debt price until it reaches its conditional expected payo¤.
We solve for pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE). For eachD 2 D that may be chosen
by the manager, each investor must have an assessment a : D ! [0; 1] regarding the probability that
the true asset type is H. In response to debt face values chosen on the equilibrium path, investor
beliefs must be consistent with Bayesrule. Actions of all agents must be sequentially optimal given
their beliefs and the actions of the other agents.
Our primary interest is in pinning down the socially optimal amount of government bonds in
light of the e¤ect on corporate leverage. The central mechanism is the interplay between government
borrowing and asymmetric information in the corporate debt market. To see this, note that if the
asset type were common knowledge, the manager would sell debt with face value equal to the true
cash ow (D = T ): The MM would then set the debt price P = T: Since the corporate debt would be
priced at its true payo¤, the speculator would have no incentive to exert costly e¤ort. On the other
hand, the UI with low terminal endowments would purchase N=T units of corporate debt, ensuring
they achieve their critical consumption level Z: That is, under symmetric information regarding
rm type, the manager would raise T units of outside funding and rst-best sharing of risks would
be achieved across investors. Thus, safe government bonds would be superuous under common
knowledge of the asset type.
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II. The Corporate Debt Market
We solve via backward induction. Consider rst the corporate debt price (P ). We know:
D  L) P = D: (2)
If the corporation issues riskless debt, the speculator has no incentive to acquire a costly signal.
If say D = L, UI hit with a negative endowment shock can submit orders for N=L units of the
debt, just enough to achieve the target terminal period consumption level Z. This corresponds to a
perfect sharing of risks across investors.
Consider next the pricing of debt for higher face values. Here we must distinguish between two
types of equilibria. In a separating equilibrium the choice of debt face value varies with the true
type T; fully revealing the managers private information. In such cases, the MM will set the debt
price equal to its true type-contingent payo¤. We have:
Separating Equilibrium) P = minfD;Tg: (3)
If D reveals T , the speculator has no incentive to exert costly e¤ort. Further, if the asset type is
revealed, each UI hit with a negative income shock can submit an order for N=minfD;Tg units of
the debt, just enough to achieve the target consumption Z. This corresponds to perfect risk sharing
across investors.
Consider next price determination in a pooling equilibrium in which D 2 (L;H] is invariant to
T . Here the debt price set by the MM will depend upon order ow. Consider then the aggregate
demand of the UI. The UI enter the debt market holding their prior belief. If the UI have a high
period 2 endowment, they have no motive to buy any debt. Conversely, if the UI anticipate the
low period 2 endowment, they may be willing to buy debt. Let x(;D;G; ) denote the optimal
-contingent demand for an UI in the event of a low period 2 endowment. Aggregate UI demand in
the event of a negative period 2 endowment shock is:
XU (D;G; ) 
Z 1
1
x(;D;G; )f()d: (4)
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We will return to the determination of the UI demand function x below.
The speculator relies on the trading of the UI to provide camouage. In fact, as shown below,
her trading gain is increasing in UI demand for corporate debt. Since the UI prefer safe stores of
value, they would put all their savings in the government storage if this were feasible. To limit their
access to such safe assets, the speculator will submit an innite order for government bonds, causing
them to be allocated on a pro rata basis.5 It follows that in the event of a low period 2 endowment,
the UI will have a residual demand for safe storage equal to N  G: The critical role played by the
government bond o¤ering is to alter the amount of residual UI storage demand migrating to the
corporate debt market.
Consider next the speculators optimal order in the corporate debt market. Since she cannot
short-sell, her optimal strategy is to place a buy order for the debt if and only if she receives
the positive signal sH . As in Maug (1998), if the speculator is to make positive expected trading
gains, she must choose her order size such that the MM cannot infer her signal. This can only be
achieved by choosing an order size such that MM cannot distinguish between no UI endowment
shock combined with speculator buying versus UI endowment shock combined with speculator not
buying. Thus, the speculator will submit an order for XU units of corporate debt upon observing a
positive signal and place zero order otherwise. Critically, the size of the speculators order size, and
hence her e¤ort incentive, is constrained by the equilibrium volume UI demand.
Table 1 depicts the order ow possibilities.
5Alternatively, the speculator could submit a random order no less than G: Both su¢ ce to mask the UI endowment
state as required to confound the MM.
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Table 1: Aggregate Demand Outcomes
Type
Speculator
Signal
UI Period 2
Endowment
Speculator
Order
UI
Order
Aggregate
Order
Probability
H sH Z  N XU XU 2XU 4
H sH Z XU 0 XU

4
H sL Z  N 0 XU XU 1 4
H sL Z 0 0 0
1 
4
L sL Z  N 0 XU XU 4
L sL Z 0 0 0

4
L sH Z  N XU XU 2XU 1 4
L sH Z XU 0 XU
1 
4
The MM set the debt price based upon aggregate demand (XA) as follows:
P (XA) = DPr(T = HjXA) + LPr(T = LjXA) 8 XA 2 f0; XU ; 2XUg: (5)
As shown in Table 1, the MM will face one of three order ows. The highest and lowest order ows
fully reveal the speculator signal, while the intermediate order ow leaves the MM confounded as
to the signal and the true asset type. Using Bayesrule the MM form beliefs as follows:
Pr[T = HjXA = 2XU ] =  (6)
Pr[T = HjXA = XU ] = 1
2
Pr[T = HjXA = 0] = 1  :
It follows from equations (5) and (6) that the debt price is increasing in aggregate demand. Further,
the responsiveness of the debt price to aggregate demand is increasing in the speculators signal
precision. Intuitively, the MM revise beliefs more aggressively in response to order ow if the
speculator has more precise information.
Continuing the backward induction, we must pin down Nash congurations for the pair (;XU ),
the speculator signal precision and UI demand. Consider rst the speculators signal precision. The
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speculator chooses some e 2  taking as given the UI demand factor XU and the pricing rule
used by the MM, with the pricing rule itself being predicated upon the speculator signal precision
postulated by the MM, call it : Using Table 1, the speculators expected trading gain is:
(e; ;XU ) =
264 e4 [D   P (2XU )] + e4 [D   P (XU )]
+1 e4 [L  P (2XU )] + 1 e4 [L  P (XU )]
375XU : (7)
An incentive compatible speculator signal precision, call it ic, equates the marginal change in
expected trading gains resulting from a change in e with the marginal e¤ort cost. This implies:
e0(ic) = 1(eic; ;XU ) = 1
2
(D   L)XU : (8)
Thus:
ic(XU ) = 	 [(D   L)XU=2] : (9)
Since	 is increasing, it follows from the preceding equation that, holding all else constant, speculator
e¤ort is increasing in the uninformed corporate debt demand XU . Intuitively, higher UI demand
allows the speculator to place larger orders and to make higher trading gains, strengthening her
e¤ort incentive.
We now return to determining the debt demands of the individual UI in the event of a low future
endowment. In order to formulate their optimal debt demand, the UI must form an expectation of
the equilibrium debt price, conditional on being hit with a negative endowment shock. From Table
1 it follows:
E[P jY2 = Z  N ] = 1
2

D + L+ (D   L)

   1
2

: (10)
Equation (10) shows the UI face adverse selection in that they expect to pay a price in excess of the
unconditional expected debt payo¤ of (D + L)=2. Intuitively, a negative endowment shock implies
higher expected order ow. And in the presence of an informed speculator, the MM will respond to
high order ow by setting a higher debt price. In fact, the price set by the MM is more sensitive to
order ow the higher the speculators signal precision. Thus, the intensity of the adverse selection
problem, as perceived by the UI, is increasing in the speculators signal precision.
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With their conditional expectation of the debt price determined, we can now pin down the
optimal debt demand for those UI with low period 2 endowments. The optimal corporate debt
demand maximizes expected period 2 utility less the expected debt price. The program is:
max
x0
1
2
minf0; N +G+ xLg+ 1
2
minf0; N +G+ xDg   xE[P jY2 = Z  N ]: (11)
Solving the preceding program, we obtain the following characterization of the optimal UI port-
folios:
 2 [1; 1)) x() = 0 (12)
 2 [1; 2)) x() = N  G
D
  2 ) x() = N  G
L
where
1(;D)  1 +

   1
2

D   L
D + L

(13)
2(;D)  1 + D
L
+

   1
2

D   L
L

:
From the preceding equations we see that if  is su¢ ciently low, adverse selection dominates
the storage motive and the respective investor boycotts the corporate debt market. Those UI with
intermediate values of  partially insure in the sense of buying just enough units of corporate debt to
ensure they will achieve the target consumption Z if T = H, implying consumption falls short of Z
if T = L: Finally, if  is su¢ ciently high, the investor completely insures in the sense of purchasing
enough units of corporate debt to ensure he achieves his target consumption level even if T = L;
implying his consumption actually overshoots Z if T = H:
Integrating over the individual debt demands, we obtain the following expression for aggregate
UI demand:
XU (D;G;N; ) = (N  G)

1
L
[1  F (2(;D))] + 1
D
[F (2(;D))  F (1(;D))]

: (14)
There are two points worth noting regarding the aggregate UI demand schedule. First, the UI
demand cuto¤s 1 and 2 are both increasing in ; implying aggregate UI demand is decreasing in
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the speculator signal precision posited by the UI. Second, aggregate UI demand increases linearly
with the size of the residual safe storage demand N  G. That is, higher government bond supply
decreases uninformed demand for corporate debt. This is the central lever at the governments
disposal in our model.
For each given debt face value D 2 (L;H] at which we wish to consider the possibility of a
pooling equilibrium of the full game, we can now determine the continuation equilibrium values
for uninformed demand and speculator signal precision. Such continuation equilibrium pairs will be
denoted (XeqU ; 
eq), and are found as solutions to equations (9) and (14). Substituting the uninformed
demand equation (14) into the speculators incentive compatibility condition (9), equilibrium is
dened implicitly by the following equation:
	

1
2
(D   L)XU (eq)

  eq = 0: (15)
The appendix shows the continuation equilibrium dened by the equation (15) is unique.
Figure 1 depicts the UI demand schedule and speculator signal precision in the event of pooling
at risky debt, with equilibrium found at their intersection. The upward sloping line depicts the
schedule ic: From equation (9) it follows that this schedule is increasing in XU . Intuitively, the
speculators e¤ort incentive is higher when there is a larger volume of uninformed trading providing
camouage. The downward sloping line depicts the schedule XU : From equation (14) it follows this
schedule is strictly decreasing in : Intuitively, the UI face a more severe adverse selection problem
when the speculator has more precise information. They respond by cutting their corporate debt
demand.
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to equation (15) we nd:
@eq
@G
=
1
2	
0()(D   L)@XU@G
1  12	0()(D   L)@XU@
< 0 (16)
@XU
@G
=   1
L
[1  F (2(;D))]  1
D
[F (2(;D))  F (1(;D))] < 0:
The preceding equations show that the equilibrium level of speculator e¤ort is decreasing in G.
Intuitively, an increase in G reduces UI demand for corporate debt. And it is this demand that
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provides the camouage and subsidy to informed speculation. As shown in Figure 1, an increase in
G manifests itself as a shift downward of the schedule XU ; implying lower equilibrium speculator
signal precision.
Again applying the Implicit Function Theorem to equation (15) it can be veried that an increase
in the size of the negative endowment shock N would increase speculator signal precision. In
particular:
@eq
@N
=  @
eq
@G
> 0: (17)
Similarly, a rst-order stochastic dominant shift in the  parameters would also increase speculator
e¤ort, since this too increases uninformed demand at each given level of speculator e¤ort. Both
e¤ects arise from the fact that UI trading provides the subsidy to informed speculation.
The following lemma summarizes the key result from this section, showing the role of government
debt in determining incentives for speculative information production.
Lemma 1 If there is pooling at risky corporate debt, speculator e¤ort in the continuation equilibrium
is increasing in the intrinsic demand for safe assets (N) and decreasing in the quantity of riskless
government debt (G).
III. The Corporate Leverage Choice
This section analyzes equilibrium leverage choice in light of the debt pricing rules described in
the previous section. Again, the equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We consider
the Intuitive Criterion renement as an extension.
The following lemma is useful in characterizing potential equilibria.
Lemma 2 The set of equilibria includes all debt face value congurations such that a manager
owning a low value asset-in-place attains at least V minL  QL, while a manager owning a high value
asset-in-place attains at least V minH  QL+H   L:
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Proof. To see the necessity of each type attaining the posited minimum utility, note that regardless of
what beliefs investors might form in response, the manager can always attain the stated minimum
by issuing debt with face value L: For su¢ ciency, consider a posited equilibrium in which each
type makes at least the posited minimum. This equilibrium can be sustained if investors impute a
deviation to the manager holding a low value asset. Given such beliefs, any deviation will yield the
deviating manager a payo¤ no greater than V minT :
Based on the preceding lemma, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There is no equilibrium in which the manager chooses debt with face value less than
L: There is a pooling equilibrium in which, regardless of the true asset type, the manager chooses
riskless debt with face value L: The set of separating equilibria are those in which the owner of a
high value asset issues debt with face value L while the owner of a low value asset issues debt with
face value in (L;H]:
Proof. The rst statement in the proposition follows from Lemma 2 and the fact that debt with face
value less than L provides the issuer with less than V minT . The second statement in the proposition
follows from Lemma 2 and the fact that debt with face value L generates issuer utility equal to
V minT . The last statement in the proposition follows from the fact that the low type cannot make
more than QL in a separating equilibrium. So he must make QL in any separating equilibrium.
For this reason, the high type cannot sell debt at price exceeding L in a separating equilibrium. So
the high type must market debt with face value L in any separating equilibrium. The low type can
then issue debt with face value in (L;H] in any separating equilibrium. Each type then attains his
respective minimum utility.
Consider nally whether there exist pooling equilibria in which the issuer, regardless of the true
type, chooses some D > L. From Lemma 2 we know that any viable pooling equilibrium has the
property that the issuer attains at least his type-contingent minimum utility V minT : With this in
mind, we use Table 1 to compute the type-contingent expected utility of the issuer in the event
of pooling at some face value D 2 (L;H]: The expected utility (VT ) of the issuer in the event of
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pooling is equal to Q times the type-conditional expectation of the debt price plus the terminal
period dividend. We have:
VH(D) = Q [I(
eq)D + (1  I(eq))L] +H  D = V minH + [QI(eq)  1][D   L] (18)
VL(D) = Q [I(
eq)L+ (1  I(eq))D] = V minL +Q(D   L)[1  I(eq)]
I() =
3
4
+ 2   :
The endogenous variable I plays an important role in the model, capturing the informational e¢ -
ciency of prices. For example, if I = 1=2 the debt price is completely uninformative, as would be
the case in a standard signaling model sans informed trading. In fact, the function I is increasing
in  with
I

1
2

=
1
2
(19)
I(1) =
3
4
:
As shown in equation (18), the high (low) type benets (su¤ers) from an increase in I. Further
from this same equation it is apparent that the low type is always better o¤ under pooling at risky
debt than in the separating equilibrium (or pooling at riskless debt with face value L). In contrast,
the high type is only better o¤ if QI  1: In fact, from Lemma 2 and equation (18) we have the
following proposition characterizing the set of potential pooling equilibria with risky debt.
Proposition 2 If the funding value Q  4=3; there is no pooling equilibrium in which the manager,
regardless of the true asset type, chooses a debt face value greater than L. For Q 2 (4=3; 2); pooling
at risky debt can be sustained if and only if the residual storage demand N  G is su¢ ciently high
to ensure:
eq  1
2
+
p
1=Q  1=2:
If Q  2; pooling can be sustained at any face value in (L;H]:
The intuition for Proposition 2 is as follows. From Lemma 2 we know a pooling equilibrium can
be sustained if and only if, regardless of the true asset type, the issuer is better o¤ pooling than
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he would be under the issuance of riskless debt with face value L: The owner of a low quality asset
is always better o¤ in the event of pooling with D > L, since he benets from overpricing of his
debt. Whether the owner of a high value asset is better or worse o¤ depends on the magnitude of
competing e¤ects. On one hand, by raising the debt face value, the issuer raises more funding in
expectation, which is valuable given Q > 1: On the other hand, the owner of the high value asset
knows the market will underprice his debt. This latter e¤ect is attenuated by high speculator e¤ort,
which serves to drive price closer to fundamentals. Thus, the critical signal precision threshold for
sustaining a pooling equilibrium is decreasing in Q:
Given our interest in social welfare, it is worthwhile to contrast the risky debt pooling equilibria
described in Proposition 2 with the other equilibria. The attractive feature of pooling at risky debt
is higher investment. The unattractive feature is that risk-sharing is distorted as the UI distort the
portfolios as shown in equation (13).
In light of these welfare tradeo¤s, a fundamental question to be addressed is whether one should
expect corporations to o¤er riskless debt to investors in response to a large intrinsic demand (N)
for safe assets. Here Proposition 2 o¤ers a stark negative result showing that, paradoxically, the
corporation may be induced to issue risky rather than riskless debt precisely when investor demand
for, and the welfare gains from, safe storage is strongest. Intuitively, as shown in Section II, an
increase in the intrinsic demand for safe storage (N) has the e¤ect of stimulating UI demand for
risky debt. And with greater uninformed demand for risky debt, an informed speculator has more
camouage for her trades in the high-yield debt market. Anticipating this ability to place larger
orders, she will exert more e¤ort. Prices will be driven closer to fundamentals (higher I) and pooling
is more readily sustained (QI  1). Further, although we focus on comparative statics with respect
to N , the same chain of reasoning shows that a rst-order stochastic dominant shift in the risk-
aversion parameters () would increase uninformed demand for risky debt, encouraging pooling at
risky debt, precisely when the social welfare benets of riskless corporate debt are highest.
Finally, although we do not assume this to be this case, it can be argued that a risky debt
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pooling equilibrium is focalrelative to the separating equilibria or pooling at safe debt. After all,
it follows from Lemma 2 that when such an equilibrium exists, the issuer is better o¤ than in the
separating equilibria or pooling at riskless debt. And this is true regardless of the issuers true type.
IV. Optimal Government Debt in Economy Without Informed Speculation
As a precursor to our analysis of the optimal quantity of government bonds in an economy
with speculation, this section contains a brief analysis of the potential role for government bonds
to increase social welfare in an economy where there is no possibility of informed speculation. This
analysis will help clarify the causal mechanisms operative in the full model, as well as helping to
distinguish our theory from existing theories of liquidity supply, e.g. Holmström and Tirole (1998).
To set a benchmark, consider rst social welfare if the type of the asset-in-place was common
knowledge. Since investment has positive NPV, the manager would raise the maximum funding
possible by marketing debt with face value T , converting each unit of funds raised into Q units of
private benets. The speculator and market-makers would have total consumption equal to their
endowments. Each UI facing a low period 2 endowment would investN in period 1 in order to receive
N in period 2, insuring against any consumption shortfall. Thus, with symmetric information, social
welfare is:
W  =
1
2
(H + L)Q+ Y s1 + Y
mm
1 + Y
ui
1  
1
2
N: (20)
Consider next an economy in which the speculator can only receive an uninformative signal. The
analysis of Sections II and III are still applicable. To cover the present case we can simply set 
equal to 1=2: Doing so, consider rst the portfolio decisions of the UI as derived in equation (13).
With  = 1=2 we obtain the following expressions for the optimal UI portfolios:
 2
h
1; 
=1=2
2

) x() = N  G
D
(21)
  =1=22 ) x() =
N  G
L

=1=2
2 = 1 +
D
L
:
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Notice, even though there is no informed speculation, the UI still have distorted portfolios
relative to the case of symmetric information between the rm and investors. Intuitively, even if
the corporate debt has a price equal to its expected payo¤, as is the case if  = 1=2, the UI have
distorted savings decisions since they do not know the true debt payo¤. Consequently, the debt
claim is not tailored to their precise need for a payo¤ equal to N with probability one.
However, the preceding equation does reveal that relative to the case where the speculator
receives an informative signal, portfolio distortions are less severe if  = 1=2. In particular, here all
UI buy some form of insurance, whereas with  > 1=2 some UI boycott the corporate debt market
altogether. In the present case, some UI underinsure and will only cover the negative endowment
shock if the rm is a high type. Others overinsure, and will receive a payo¤ in excess of the negative
shock if the rm is a high type. Both distortions create deadweight loss.
Consider next equilibrium corporate leverage in the absence of informed speculation. From
Proposition 2 it follows that the equilibrium set then has a simple characterization. If Q < 2,
there is no possibility of pooling at any D > L. If Q  2; pooling can be sustained at any face
value D 2 (L;H]: Notice, in contrast to the full model with informed speculation, here equilibrium
corporate leverage is independent of the level of uninformed storage demand as captured by the
parameter N:
IfQ < 2 there is no risk-sharing distortion as the corporate sector supplies the UI with the riskless
debt they need to perfectly cover any negative endowment shock. However, there is a deadweight
loss relative to symmetric information in the form of underinvestment. With this in mind consider
the optimal quantity of government debt. It is apparent that changes in government debt here have
no e¤ect on risk-bearing by the UI, nor any e¤ect on equilibrium investment. Thus, any G 2 [0; G]
is an optimal government debt supply if Q < 2 and  = 1=2:
Consider next the optimal supply of government debt when growth options are more protable,
with Q  2. As shown in Proposition 1, it is possible that equilibrium will entail pooling at riskless
debt with face value D = L or that a separating equilibrium occurs. In either of these two cases,
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government debt supply is irrelevant since the UI achieve perfect insurance against endowment
shocks, while corporate investment would be left unchanged.
From Proposition 2 we know that with Q  2 it is also possible for rms to pool at some
D 2 (L;H]: The question is whether and how the supply of government bonds can a¤ect social
welfare under such an equilibrium. Relative to social welfare under symmetric information (W ),
we have the following deadweight loss in the event of pooling:
DWL =
1
2
(H  D)Q+ 1
2
(N  G)
266664
1
2
 
D L
L

[1  F (2)]
+12
 
D L
L
 =1=22Z
1
(   1)f(d)
377775 : (22)
In the preceding equation we see that deadweight loss arises from underinvestment and distorted
risk bearing. As shown in equation (21), in the event of pooling at risky debt, some UI underinsure
and others overinsure. Here by supplying riskless debt the government directly increases social
welfare by allowing the UI to substitute public debt with a known payo¤ for corporate debt with an
uncertain payo¤. E¤ectively, the government debt reduces the residual storage need of the UI from
N to N  G, with the preceding equation revealing a direct welfare benet. Since social welfare is
increasing in G, here it is optimal for the government to o¤er the maximum feasible amount of safe
storage, implying G = G:
Based on the preceding analysis, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If informed speculation is impossible then the government can maximize total social
welfare by o¤ering G 2 [0; G] if Q < 2 and G = G if Q  2:
Before closing this section it is worth emphasizing that in the absence of informed speculation,
government debt has no e¤ect on the equilibrium choice of corporate leverage. That is, there is no
crowding-out of risky debt, as is the case when informed speculation is possible. Consequently, the
role of government debt here is a direct one, allowing the UI to substitute out of corporate debt and
into government debt dollar for dollar. There is no riskless debt multiplier e¤ect.
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V. Optimal Government Debt in Economy With Informed Speculation
This section analyses the role that variation in the quantity of safe government debt can play in
increasing social welfare. Following the same steps as in Section IV, we rst consider equilibrium
in the absence of government debt. We then consider optimal government debt in light of the
anticipated equilibrium sans intervention. Contrasting equilibria in which informed speculation
does and does not occur, Pareto improvements are impossible since uninformed investors are worse
o¤ when informed speculation occurs while the speculator is better o¤. Therefore, we take the
perspective of a utilitarian social planner placing equal weight on all agents.
A. Equilibrium With Zero Government Debt
This section considers the prospective equilibrium the government anticipates should it not issue
debt. Proposition 1 shows it is always possible to sustain pooling at riskless debt with face value L
as well as separating equilibria in which the type is revealed. For brevity, we label the riskless debt
pooling equilibrium LPOOL, while a separating equilibrium is labeled SEP. If either equilibrium
will be implemented with or without government debt, then the choice of G has no e¤ect on total
social welfare. After all, risk-sharing is already rst-best, and the government debt would have no
e¤ect on corporate investment.
In order for government debt to alter social welfare, it must be that the private sector would
implement pooling at risky debt in its absence. Recall, Lemma 2 and equation (18) show QI  1 is
necessary for pooling at risky debt. With this in mind, we consider G = 0 and let NRP denote the
critical value of the parameter N at which it is possible to sustain pooling at risky debt with face
value D > L. We call such a risky debt pooling equilibrium RPOOL. By denition:
QI[((NRP )] = 1) N 0RP (Q) =  
Q 2
@I
@
@
@N
< 0: (23)
Apparently, the function NRP is decreasing in Q: Intuitively, the high type nds pooling at risky
debt more attractive if project NPV is increased. Restoring high type indi¤erence between RPOOL
and LPOOL (or SEP) requires lowering N , with a concomitant reduction in speculator e¤ort. It
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follows from equation (19) that:
lim
Q# 4
3
NRP (Q) = 1 (24)
NRP (2) = 0:
That is, sustaining RPOOL would require an innite amount of uninformed trading volume as Q
converges to 4/3, and requires zero uninformed trading volume if Q  2: The downward sloping
schedule in Figure 2 depicts NRP : It is only possible to sustain RPOOL at points on or to the right
of this schedule.
B. Optimal Government Debt
This subsection pins down the optimal government debt supply on the various regions depicted
in Figure 2. If LPOOL or SEP will be implemented with or without government debt, then the
choice of G has no e¤ect on total social welfare and no further analysis is necessary. So, we shall
conne attention to the interesting case where RPOOL would be implemented sans intervention.
This is only possible on Regions II-VI.
We pin down the optimal choice of G in response to RPOOL in two steps. We rst show that
o¤ering some government debt, while still sustaining RPOOL increases social welfare. We then
consider whether pruning RPOOL is both feasible and optimal. To begin with the rst assertion,
note that if the government o¤ers G  N   NRP (Q), the condition QI  1 is satised and so
RPOOL remains an equilibrium. It is readily veried social welfare is increasing in G given that
RPOOL is still implemented. To see this, note that in RPOOL we have the following deadweight
loss relative to symmetric information (W ):
DWLRPOOL =
1
2
(H  D)(Q  1) + e(eq) + 1
2
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:
(25)
The rst term in equation (25) captures underinvestment relative to symmetric information re-
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garding type. The second term captures speculator e¤ort costs which are zero under symmetric
information. The third term is based upon the UI portfolios derived in equation (12). The rst
term in the large brackets captures the fact that those UI with  2 [1; 1] bypass the purchase of
corporate debt altogether, despite the fact that there would be a social gain of    1 per unit of
incremental safe assets purchased by these investors. The second term in the large brackets repre-
sents the social cost associated with overinsurance by extremely risk-averse UI. The nal term in the
large brackets reects the fact that adverse selection induces UI with  2 (1; 2) to only partially
insure against costly consumption shortfalls.
Di¤erentiating equation (25) with respect to G we obtain:
dDWLRPOOL
dG
= e0()
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:
From the fact that speculator e¤ort is decreasing in G (equation (16)) and the fact that the two
UI portfolio cuto¤s are increasing in  (equation (13)) it follows that social welfare in RPOOL is
increasing in G: The intuition is as follows. First, the provision of safe public debt serves to reduce
speculator e¤ort costs. Second, the induced reduction in speculator e¤ort reduces the portfolio dis-
tortions of marginal uninformed investors. This e¤ect is captured by the nal term in the preceding
equation. Finally, with additional safe assets, inframarginal uninformed investors substitute out of
corporate bonds which represent an imperfect savings vehicle. This e¤ect is captured by the term
with large square brackets in the preceding equation.
We have the following lemma which shows that if RPOOL is to be implemented, the government
will nd it optimal to issue the maximum debt consistent with RPOOL remaining an equilibrium.
Lemma 3 If the corporation pools at risky debt with face value D > L; social welfare is increasing
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in G. The optimal government debt supply for implementing such an equilibrium is eG, with
eG  G for Q  2
and
eG  minfG;N  NRP (Q)g for Q 2 4
3
; 2

:
The government has the ability to prune RPOOL if G > N NRP (Q):We now evaluate whether
it is socially optimal to prune RPOOL in order to bring about SEP or LPOOL. To begin, note that
we have the following reduction in social welfare relative to the symmetric information case (W )
in SEP and LPOOL:
DWLSEP = DWLLPOOL =
1
2
(Q  1)(H   L): (27)
As reected in the preceding equation, the only distortion in SEP and LPOOL is underinvestment.
These equilibria are socially attractive in that the corporation e¤ectively supplies the UI with riskless
debt, so there are no savings distortions and no costly speculator e¤ort.
To pin down the optimal government debt supply, it will be convenient to compute the critical
value of Q; call it QPUB; at which the social planner would be indi¤erent between LPOOL (or SEP)
and RPOOL, with the latter evaluated at G = 0. Equating the respective deadweight losses we
have:
QPUB = 1 +
e[(N)] + 12N
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(28)
Apparently, QPUB is increasing in N . Intuitively, an increase in the size of the endowment shock
raises the speculator e¤ort and risk sharing costs arising from pooling at risky debt. Maintaining
social planner indi¤erence across the equilibria then necessitates a compensating increase inQ, which
raises deadweight costs of underinvestment, with underinvestment higher at LPOOL than RPOOL.
The schedule QPUB is shown in Figure 2, with the planner preferring to LPOOL to RPOOL at
points to the right of the schedule.
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Turning to Figure 2, a positive amount of government debt is isomorphic to reducing N to
N 0 = N   G. With this in mind, consider rst starting an arbitrary point inside Region II. Here
risk sharing concerns dominate investment given that N is high relative to Q: Consequently, the
planner prefers LPOOL to RPOOL. Here the optimal government debt supply is G: To see this,
suppose rst G  N  NRP ; so that pruning being infeasible. In this case, supplying maximal debt
is still optimal since the welfare loss in RPOOL is decreasing in G: If instead G > N  NRP , it is
optimal to prune RPOOL by o¤ering maximal debt. To see this, note that social welfare is higher
under LPOOL than RPOOL as one crosses the pruning boundary from Region II to Region I.
Consider next an arbitrary point inside Region III. Since Q  2; RPOOL remains an equilibrium
regardless of G. Further, here the planner prefers RPOOL to LPOOL given that investment has
such high NPV. Consequently, provided that RPOOL would still be played, since it is still in the
equilibrium set, G is optimal. Here the goal is to implement RPOOL with minimal deadweight
loss. Less formally, one may view this strategy as risky to the government since it makes RPOOL
less attractive to the high type, potentially bringing about the socially inferior equilibrium LPOOL.
Thus, we may properly think of G as being a socially optimal debt supply on Region III under
the assumption that RPOOL will continue to be played given that it remains an element of the
equilibrium set.
Consider next starting at an arbitrary point inside Region IV. Here too G is optimal. To see this,
note that initially the planner prefers LPOOL to RPOOL. By supplying small amounts of debt the
government makes RPOOL more e¢ cient. By supplying still more debt the government increases
the e¢ ciency of RPOOL to the point that RPOOL becomes preferred to LPOOL. This is seen in
Figure IV as a horizontal move from Region IV into Region III. And once inside Region III, the
argument in the preceding paragraph applies.
Consider next an arbitrary point inside Region V. Notice that even with G = 0 the planner
prefers RPOOL to LPOOL. By supplying positive amounts of government debt the planner increases
social welfare in RPOOL still further. Thus, the optimal policy here is to issue issue maximal
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debt consistent with RPOOL being played. For example, applying the same reasoning as above
G = minfG;N  NRP (Q)g is optimal under the conjecture that RPOOL will still be implemented
given that it remains an element of the equilibrium set.
Consider nally starting at an arbitrary point inside Region VI. Here too G = minfG;N  
NRP (Q)g is an optimal government debt supply. To see this, note that the planner prefers LPOOL
to RPOOL at the initial point. By supplying small amounts of debt the government makes RPOOL
more e¢ cient. By supplying still more debt the government increases the e¢ ciency of RPOOL to
the point that RPOOL becomes preferred to LPOOL. This is seen as a horizontal move from Region
VI into Region V. And once inside Region V, the argument made in the preceding paragraph applies.
Based on the preceding discussion we have the following characterization of the optimal govern-
ment bond o¤ering.
Proposition 4 The choice of G is irrelevant if a separating equilibrium or pooling at riskless debt
will occur with or without government debt. If Q  2 and pooling at risky debt will occur with or
without government debt, the optimal government bond o¤ering is G: If Q is su¢ ciently low relative
to N , it is optimal for the government to attempt pruning of risky debt equilibria by o¤ering G:
For intermediate values of Q relative to N; the government should o¤er the maximal feasible debt
consistent with risk debt pooling, with G = minfG;N  NRP (Q)g being optimal.
Recall, Proposition 3 showed that if informed speculation is impossible, the optimal government
bond supply is invariant to N: In contrast, Proposition 4 shows that if informed speculation is
possible, optimal government bond supply is increasing in the size of intrinsic storage demand, as
captured by the endowment shock parameter N . The intuition is as follows. In cases where the
government would like to prune RPOOL, it must increase its bond o¤ering in response to increases in
N . After all, larger endowment shocks translate into higher uninformed demand for risky corporate
debt, making pooling at risky debt more attractive to the high type. In cases where the government
would like to implement RPOOL, while minimizing risk sharing distortions, if N increases, the
government can increase its bond o¤ering but still preserve the issuers willingness to implement
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RPOOL.
Recall, Proposition 3 showed that if informed speculation is impossible, the optimal government
bond supply is increasing in Q: In contrast, Proposition 4 shows that if informed speculation is
possible, the optimal government bond supply is non-monotonic in marginal Q: The intuition is as
follows. For very low values of Q relative to N (Region II) the government would like to prune
RPOOL, so maximal debt is optimal. For intermediate values of Q (Regions V and VI), the govern-
ment optimally supplies an intermediate amount of debt in order to avoid pruning the risky debt
equilibrium. If Q  2; the government again wants to avoid pruning the risky debt equilibrium but
can do so while o¤ering maximal debt. Here the high value of investment induces pooling at risky
debt even with maximal government bond siphoning.
VI. Extensions
This section shows that one may relax various modeling assumptions with the central arguments
still being applicable.
A. The Intuitive Criterion
To begin, we return to Section III and consider which of the perfect Bayesian equilibria satisfy
the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987), following with a discussion of implications for
optimal government debt supply.
A posited equilibrium fails to satisfy the Intuitive Criterion if one of the issuer types would
benet from choosing a di¤erent face value, provided this were su¢ cient to convince investors of his
true type, with the other type being strictly worse o¤ choosing that same face value regardless of
the beliefs formed in response. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 5 All separating equilibria satisfy the Intuitive Criterion, as does pooling at riskless
debt with face value L. If Q  3=2; pooling at risky debt does not satisfy the Intuitive Criterion.
For Q > 3=2, pooling at risky debt satises the Intuitive Criterion if and only if the residual storage
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demand N  G is su¢ ciently high to ensure:
eq  1
2
h
1 +
p
4Q=(2Q  1)  2
i
: (29)
Proof. Given any PBE, the low type never gains from deviating if doing so identies him, so attention
can be conned to the high types incentive to deviate. Consider then any separating equilibrium or
pooling at D = L: Only a deviation to a face value greater than L can make the high type strictly
better o¤, but then the low type would also gain from this deviation under some beliefs. So the
Intuitive Criterion admits imputing such a deviation to the low type. Given such beliefs, there is
no incentive for either type to deviate. Next, consider that pruning a pooling PBE featuring face
value D > L via the Intuitive Criterion demands nding a deviation D0 such that:
QD0 +H  D0 > VH(D)
QD0 < VL(D):
The nal inequality stated in the proposition implies no such D0 exists.
The preceding proposition shows that only a subset of the risky debt pooling equilibria described
in Proposition 2 satisfy the Intuitive Criterion. Apparently, satisfaction of the Intuitive Criterion
demands a higher level of speculator e¤ort and informational e¢ ciency. It follows that under the
Intuitive Criterion, the pruning of RPOOL via the supply of government debt, should that be
desired, can be achieved with lower government debt capacity (G) given that a smaller reduction
in speculator signal precision su¢ ces. On the other hand, maintaining RPOOL as an equilibrium,
should that be desired, is only possible with a smaller government bond o¤ering. This last point
again highlights the delicate balancing inherent in a government strategy of siphoning o¤ demand
from the corporate debt market while still hoping to implement RPOOL, albeit in a more socially
e¢ cient form.
B. Multiple Corporate Debt Issuers
This subsection considers how the equilibrium set described in Section III is a¤ected if there is
more than one corporate debt issuer, following with implications for the optimal government debt
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supply.
To limit the number of equilibrium permutations, attention is conned to symmetric equilibria
with two i.i.d. corporations. We begin by noting that once again it is possible to sustain a given
debt conguration as an equilibrium provided that regardless of type, a manager gets at least his
payo¤ from issuing riskless debt with face value L (Lemma 2). Further, the existence of another
issuer has no e¤ect on a managers equilibrium payo¤ in any of the separating equilibria described
in Proposition 1. So one symmetric equilibrium entails both managers signaling their private infor-
mation as described in Proposition 1. Similarly, the existence of another issuer has no e¤ect on a
managers equilibrium payo¤ in the event that he issues riskless debt with face value L regardless
of his type (pooling). Thus, there is another symmetric equilibrium in which both managers issue
riskless debt with face value L regardless of their true asset type.
Consider nally equilibria in which the manager chooses D > L regardless of T (Proposition
2). In this class of equilibria, the presence of another issuer does indeed have an e¤ect on the
managers payo¤. To see this, note that, as shown in the appendix, the presence of a rival debt
issuer causes an inward shift of the uninformed debt demand curve XU facing each issuer. We know
an inward shift in the uninformed demand curve results in a reduction of speculator e¤ort (eq) in
the continuation equilibrium. And with lower speculator e¤ort, pooling at risky debt becomes less
viable since the necessary condition (29) is less likely to be satised. Intuitively, the presence of
another corporate debt issuer siphons o¤ some of the uninformed debt demand, resulting in lower
informational e¢ ciency in the event of pooling. And with lower informational e¢ ciency, a high type
is less willing to pool given that he will face more severe underpricing of his debt. However, with
su¢ ciently large endowment shocks (N), this equilibrium may still be implemented by the private
sector even if there are multiple corporate issuers.
It follows that with multiple issuers the pruning of RPOOL via the supply of government debt,
should that be desired, can be achieved with lower government debt capacity (G) given that a
smaller reduction in speculator signal precision su¢ ces. On the other hand, maintaining RPOOL
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as an equilibrium, should that be desired, is only possible with a smaller government bond o¤ering.
C. Cournot Game
We have assumed that the government acts as the rst-mover in debt markets. This can be
viewed as approximating reality inasmuch as the future stock of government debt can be anticipated
by rms given budget projections. For example, during the 1990s it was widely anticipated that the
stock of U.S. government debt on o¤er would dwindle. Further, central banks often provide some
form of forward guidance regarding their intent to increase or decrease the stock of government debt
held on their balance sheets. Although not a full commitment, forward guidance can be viewed as
o¤ering an approximation of the benets associated with rst-mover status.
The preceding comments notwithstanding, it is worthwhile to consider which of our posited
equilibria would survive if the government choice of G was made simultaneously with the corporate
choice of D: To this end, let (G; DL; D

H) denote the optimal government bond supply and induced
corporate debt face values (across types) in the original Stackelberg game. Since (DL; D

H) were
optimal in response to G in the Stackelberg game, they are a Nash response to G in the Cournot
game. Thus, we need only assess whether G is optimal for the government given that the corporate
sector implements (DL; D

H):
If (DL; D

H) = (L;L); as in LPOOL, or (D

L; D

H) = (D > L;L), as in SEP, social welfare is
invariant to G and so the original G is Nash. It follows that the risky debt pruning policy, with
G = G; described as optimal on Region II of Figure 2, remains an optimal government policy in
the Cournot game.
The nal case to be considered are those Stackelberg equilibria where the government chooses
G with the intent to induce pooling at risky debt, DL = D

H > L: Here we recall from Lemma 3
that in such an RPOOL, social welfare is increasing in G: Thus, the posited vector (G; DL; D

H) is
only a Cournot equilibrium if G = G: This condition is satised on Regions II, III and IV of Figure
2, as well as on Regions V and VI if G  N  NRP (Q):
If instead (Q;N) fall into Regions V or VI, but with G > N  NRP (Q) = G; then the posited
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Stackelberg equilibrium is not a Cournot equilibrium. Intuitively, in such a Stackelberg equilibrium
the government implements RPOOL by refraining from o¤ering the maximal feasible debt. But
in response to RPOOL, maximal debt is optimal. At a deeper level one can view such ne-tuning
policies as su¤ering from a time-consistency problem. The government wants the corporation to
choose a high debt face value, to achieve high expected investment. But once the corporation has
done so, the government has the incentive to choose G with the goal of minimizing the risk-sharing
distortions arising when corporations pool at risky debt. Here one sees a role for reputational
concerns.
Conclusions
In recent years there has been increasing concern over a potential scarcity of safe assets. Seem-
ingly paradoxically, corporations have responded by increasing the supply of junk debt, consistent
with a more general historical negative correlation between government bond yields and the high-
yield share in total corporate debt.
In this paper we present a positive framework for understanding the conjunction of safe asset
scarcity and overheated corporate debt markets. This provides the foundation for a normative
framework for thinking about the welfare consequences of government-supplied safe bonds. We start
from a canonical debt signaling framework, adding one additional element: endogenous trading by
uninformed investors and an informed speculator. We argue that an overheated debt market, with
low social welfare, emerges when safe asset shortages support a speculative high yield debt market.
If there is a safe asset shortage, uninformed demand migrates to the junk debt market. The increase
in uninformed demand spurs speculator information production. This drives prices of junk debt
closer to fundamentals, encouraging rms with positive information to pool at high face values. The
social benet of such an outcome is high corporate investment. One social cost of this outcome is the
cost of speculator information production. A resulting social cost of asymmetric information across
investors is distorted portfolios. And to the extent that some uninformed investors are biased away
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from saving adequately, distress costs may result. Paradoxically, we show the corporate sector is
more likely to impose the negative externality associated with risky debt precisely when it is large.
In this economy, the government can increase social welfare by o¤ering to investors even a
limited amount of safe bonds. For example, the government can o¤er safe bonds with an eye toward
deterring pooling at risky corporate debt. Safe government bonds siphon o¤ uninformed demand
from junk debt markets. This lowers speculative information production, driving prices away from
fundamentals. If this e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong, corporations will opt to issue riskless debt instead of
junk debt. That is, riskless government bonds serve to crowd-in safe corporate debt, while crowding
out investment nanced by risky debt. This increases social welfare if marginal Q is su¢ ciently low.
Alternatively, the government can supply safe government bonds with an eye toward increasing the
e¢ ciency with which the private market implements pooling at risky debt. Here the siphoning e¤ect
of government bonds serves to induce marginal reductions in socially wasteful speculator e¤ort and
mitigates the extent of investor-level portfolio distortions.
One can also think of our framework as allowing one to understand an unconventional channel
through which central bank operations may operate, alleviating corporate leverage externalities. For
example, contractions in the central bank balance sheet increase the amount of government bonds in
circulation, siphoning o¤ demand for risky corporate debt and cooling o¤ speculative debt markets.
As we show, such operations increase social welfare when risk-sharing concerns dominate concerns
over corporate investment incentives.
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Appendix
Lemma A1: Existence of Unique Continuation Equilibrium
Dene the function   with domain [1=2; 1] based upon the speculators incentive condition as
follows:
 ()  	

1
2
(D   L)(N  G)

1
L
[1  F (2(;D))] + 1
D
[F (2(;D))  F (1(;D))]

The function   is continuous and strictly decreasing with  (1=2) > 1=2. It follows there exists a
unique solution to the equation  () =  in (1=2; 1):
Lemma A2: Reduction in Uninformed Demand with Two Corporate Debt Issuers
For brevity, let   N   G: Consider then the portfolio problem of an individual UI. Let k
denote the number of defaults against which the agent wants to insure, with k 2 f0; 1; 2g: In this
connection, let xk denote the number of units of debt of each issuer the investor must hold in order
to achieve a payo¤ of  given that there are k defaults. We have:
xk = [kL+ (2  k)D] 1
We can pin down the optimum portfolio here using perturbation arguments. Consider rst
an investor anticipating the low future endowment who holds zero units of debt. His gain from
increasing his holdings of each issuers debt innitesimally is equal to


1
4
(2L) +
1
4
(2D) +
1
2
(L+D)

  2E(P ):
Consider next an investor with initial portfolio holding of x0 contemplating an increase in his
holdings. His gain from increasing his holdings of each issuers debt innitesimally is equal to


1
4
(2L) +
1
2
(L+D)

  2E(P ):
Finally, consider an investor with initial portfolio holding of x1 contemplating an increase in his
holdings. His gain from increasing his holdings of each issuers debt innitesimally is equal to


1
4
(2L)

  2E(P ):
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From the preceding perturbation gain equations we obtain the following critical cuto¤s for a net
gain to increasing the portfolio:
b1  2E(P )
L+D
;b2  4E(P )
2L+D
;b3  4E(P )
L
:
And we have the following portfolio rule:
  b1 ) x() = 0
 2 (b1;b2)) x() = 
2D
 2 (b2;b3)) x() = 
L+D
  b3 ) x() = 
2L
:
In contrast, with one issuer we had the following thresholds:
1 =
2E[P ]
L+D
; 2 =
2E[P ]
L
:
And the following portfolio rule.
  1 ) x() = 0
 2 (1; 2)) x() = 
D
  2 ) x() = 
L
:
And we verify that for all  demand is lower with two issuers than with one issuer:
 2 (1;b2) : 
2D
<

D
 2 (b2; 2) : 
L+D
<

D
 2 (2;b3) : 
L+D
<

L
 > b3 : 
2L
<

L
:
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Figure 1: Uninformed Demand and Speculator Signal with Risky Debt
Functional forms are: e(σ) = [1 + ln( 1
2
)]− ln(1− σ)− 2σ and F (θ) = 1− 1
θ
.
L = 50, D = H = 700, N = 12. Base G = 5 on the solid XU curve and G = 6 on the
dashed curve.
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Figure 2: Private versus Public Preferences
Same functional forms and parameters as in Figure 1. N ∈ [0, 14].
